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Introduction 
During this semester, I interned at Danish Atlantic Committee, and then the Institute of Military History and 
War Theory at the Royal Danish Defense College. During my internship period, my tasks included 
researching current security and defense affairs, writing articles and giving lectures to high school classes on 
these topics. Consequently, I have gained a thorough understanding of the topics of the time. A topic that 
was especially relevant, and discussed at both my internships, is the Ukraine crisis.  
Since the beginning of 2014 Ukraine has been the host of many troubles. Starting with the dilemma of 
choosing between a deal with the EU vs. a deal with Russia, President Yanukovych seemed to be choosing 
the EU, until the last moment, and then choose the Russia-deal instead. This outraged citizens who wanted 
Ukraine closer to the West, and possibly join the EU. The outraged piled on top of general outrage about 
corruption and lack of transparency in the democratic system. Ultimately the outrage led to protests on 
Maidan Square, which then led the government to respond with force. In the end, the protesters and police 
had violent clashes, and the protests gained international attention. Yanukovych fled the country to Russia, 
and through an election in June 2014, Poroshenko took over the seat as president. But Russia viewed this 
change in power as a coup d’état from the west, trying to make Ukraine closer to the EU, and in effect, 
NATO and the US. This all came after the 2008 war in Georgia, where Russia had drawn the line, after 
NATO had declared that Georgia and Ukraine would become members in the future. The Western idea of a 
European society, built on the basic freedom rights, the rule of law, and economic prosperity, all bound 
together in the cross-border co-operations that are the EU and NATO, is being challenged by the Russian 
geopolitical approach to re-launch their superpower-aspirations, and return the empire, through any means 
necessary. And in the middle of this great battle, is Ukraine. Some have argued that EU and NATO 
expansions, and Russia feeling threatened in their sphere of interest spurred the conflicts on. Others have 
argued that Russia’s foreign policy in the later years has become more and more aggressive, in order to 
regain a superpower status. The conflict over Ukraine’s future has become a battlefield of East versus West, 
instead of focusing on how Ukraine can create a stable and reliable government, free of corruption, as the 
citizens wished. 
This project will use neoclassical realism to examine how the two sides in the conflict act and balance each 
other.  
 
Problem statement 
How can the Ukraine crisis illustrate the battle between the West and Russia, seen through neoclassical 
realism?  
Theoretical framework 
This chapter concerns the theoretical framework of the project, introducing the neoclassical realist approach, 
as well as outlining how the theory will be operationalized.  
 
Neoclassical realism 
The following chapter will go through the theory neoclassical realism, with departure in Gideon Rose’s 
article from 1998 “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”.  
 
Neoclassical realism is a branch of realism that merges elements from classical realism and neorealism. Both 
of these theories try to explain the outcomes of state interactions, and are thus theories of international 
politics. As Kenneth Waltz described it, theories of international politics: 
 
“ . . . can describe the range of likely outcomes of the actions and interactions of states within a given system 
and show how the range of expectations varies as systems change. […] a theory of international politics 
bears on the foreign policies of nations while claiming to explain only certain aspects of them” (Rose 
1998:145). 
 
Theories of foreign policy try to explain what states seek to achieve in the external realm. Foreign policy is 
driven by external and internal factors, which is why Rose argues to strive an account that seeks to include 
the factors relevant to the specific case (ibid). Theory of foreign policy falls into several schools; 
Innenpolitik theory which focuses on the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy, offensive realism 
which reverses innenpolitik and argues that systemic factors are always dominant, and defensive realism 
which takes a softer line and argues that systemic factors in practice drive some states but not others 
(ibid:146). Rose introduces neoclassical realism as the fourth school. It incorporates both internal and 
external variables, and systemizes insights from the classical school of realism.  
 
Neoclassical realism, like other versions of realism, assumes that the international system is anarchical. But 
neoclassical realists argue that both state leadership and foreign policy operate within the broad parameters 
of the anarchical system. They argue that “…anarchy gives states considerable latitude in defining their 
security interests, and the relative distribution of power merely sets parameters for grand strategy” (Lobell 
et al. 2009:7).  
 
Neoclassical realism assumes the ambition of a state’s foreign policy is driven by the place the state holds in 
the international system, and thus its relative material power capabilities (Rose 1998:147). This is what, Rose 
argues, makes the theory realist. However, the impact of these capabilities is complex and indirect, as 
systemic pressures have to be translated through intervening variables. This is what makes the theory 
neoclassical (ibid). According to neoclassical realists, relative material power is what establishes the basic 
parameters of a state’s foreign policy. As it is the political leaders of the state that makes foreign policy, it is 
their perception of relative power that matters. So, an analysis of power should examine the strength of a 
certain state relative to their societies, as surroundings affect the proportion of the national resources (ibid).  
Neoclassical realism argues that innenpolitik is misguided, because if there is one single dominant factor that 
shapes foreign policy patterns, it would be the state’s relative power versus the rest of the international 
system, and thus that is where the analysis should begin. In terms of defensive realism, its emphasis on a 
state’s response tends to overlook the fact that perception of a threat is shaped by relative material power 
(Rose 1998:150). Lastly, neoclassical realists argue that offensive realism fails as it is only limited to 
systemic factors, which are imprecise most of the time (ibid:152). 
Neoclassical realists argue that a state’s foreign policy cannot surpass the limits of the international 
environment. Therefore, one must examine the effect of the international system on national behavior, 
meaning the state’s relative position in the international system (ibid:151). Rose argues that the influence of 
relative power is not always visible to the actors themselves, so analysts who do not begin by looking at this 
influence might wrongly see a causal significance to other, minor factors (ibid).  
Rose tries to outline how one should operationalize the concept of relative power. He argues that power 
equals the capabilities a state has to influence other states. It is important to distinguish between the power 
resources a state has and the state’s foreign policy interests (ibid:151f). One should not assume that states 
seeks security, but rather that a state will respond to the uncertainty of the anarchical system by trying to 
control the external environment (ibid:152).  
To understand how states interpret their external environment, and respond to it, one must analyze systemic 
pressures and how they are translated through their unit-level intervening variable, e.g. the decision makers’ 
perceptions and the domestic state structure (ibid). Neoclassical realists lie in the middle of structuralists and 
constructivists. The former see a direct link between systemic constraints and unit-level behavior, whereas 
the latter deny that objective systemic constraints exist at all, but instead, the international reality is socially 
constructed (ibid). Neoclassical realists argue there is an objective reality of relative power, and it has effects 
in the outcome of state interactions, but that states do not necessarily see this reality correctly (ibid:153).  
Neoclassical realism focuses on the role of both independent and intervening variables, while it bases its 
narrative in the theoretical purpose (ibid). Additionally, the works of neoclassical realists are narratives or 
case studies, primarily of great powers and how they respond to an increase or decrease in their relative 
material power (ibid:154).  
Paul Kennedy argued that the economic rise and fall of great powers are linked to its growth as an important 
military power. He argues that this is due to the fact that states seek to control their environment, and thus 
more powerful states take on larger security goals than the less powerful (ibid). States will use the tools they 
have to gain control over their environment, and state behavior will be adapted in tune with the external 
constraints, conditioned by the changes in relative power. This also means that states will try to balance their 
actions to their environment.  
Balancing are the actions a state takes to even out the power-balance of the international system, primarily 
with the goal to equalize itself with a more powerful state. Balancing can come in the form of internal and 
external actions. Internal balancing could be investment in military. External balancing could be to enter into 
a military alliance with another state. Balancing comes in different forms, and is often classified as either 
soft, semi-hard or hard (Kluth & Pilegaard 2015:1).  
Soft power relies on coercion and attraction. Joseph Nye argued that soft balancing is linked to culture and 
ideology, and the attractiveness hereof (Layne 2012:204). This can be in pop culture, as well as political 
values. Also, it can be in the form of foreign policy, as a state can portray itself as a force of good for 
instance. Likewise, soft balancing can be diplomatic acts, like cooperation with other states. This also helps 
lay the foundation for semi-hard or hard balancing in the future (Kluth & Pilegaard 2015:6).  
Semi-hard balancing can be seen as the prerequisite to hard balancing, in that the acts of semi-hard power 
primarily focus on building the state’s military capabilities (ibid:7). Thus, expanding capabilities for military 
interventions, and ensuring the proper capabilities for future hard balancing, is semi-hard balancing (ibid). 
 
Hard balancing is the exertion of military power against a stronger state, or a challenger. The act of hard 
balancing is usually done due to fear of submission or annihilation (Layne 2006:8). Hard power can be seen, 
not only as military capabilities, but also economic wealth that can be turned into military strength (Layne 
2012:211). 
 
Operationalization 
Based on Rose's article on neoclassical realism, a set of hypotheses can be set: 
 
• States' foreign policy is determined by systemic-level variables, principally relative power and 
position in the international system 
 
• States filter systemic-level variables through the intervening variables of domestic politics and the 
decision makers' perceptions in order to produce foreign policy 
 
Foreign policy can be linked to the state’s relative power and position in the international system. As 
mentioned above, states that have more relative power, and are higher up in the international system, will 
often take on larger security tasks. When understanding their relative power and position internationally, 
states also consider their domestic politics, as well as the perceptions of the decision makers. This means that 
states understand their own position and power through how its decision makers view the world. When 
taking these hypotheses into account, it can be assumed that in order to understand states' behavior in foreign 
policy, it is necessary to look at: 
 
o The state's relative power 
o The state's position in the international system 
o The domestic politics of the state 
o The perceptions of the decision makers of the state 
 
In the following analysis, I will examine the above factors of both Russia and the US, while keeping focus 
on their actions surrounding the Ukraine crisis. I will look at both states relative power by looking at their 
economic and military capabilities in the years leading up to the Ukraine crisis. Additionally, I will look at 
their position in the international system. When looking at both these factors, I will do so while keeping in 
mind the perceptions held by the decision-making elite in each country, as well as the domestic situation in 
each country. Additionally, I will examine the balancing acts performed by both states, to understand how 
both have tried to balance each other. This will also look at both countries relative power capabilities.   
Analysis 
In this analysis, I will look at the Ukraine crisis through a neoclassical realist premise. The objective of the 
analysis is the understand how Russia and the West have acted in the crisis, and in relation to each other, in 
order to illustrate how to Ukraine crisis has become a battle of the superpowers. To start out, I will examine 
the events of the crisis. Afterwards I will examine Russia's relative power, position in the international 
system, the domestic politics that might have had relevance for their actions in relation to the crisis, and the 
perceptions of the decision makers in terms of both the crisis and Russia. Subsequently I will examine the 
same factors for The US. Lastly, I will explore the balancing aspect of the conflict, to understand how Russia 
and the US have sought to balance each other throughout the crisis. 
Time of the Ukraine Crisis 
In November and December of 2013, protests had risen in Ukraine, and reached a climax when the country’s 
President, Viktor Yanukovych, decided to strike a surprise deal with Russia, instead of choosing the 
Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, which had been previously negotiated. The AA would be “… a 
new state in the development of the EU-Ukraine contractual relations, aiming at political association and 
economic integration” (EEAS 2015).  
When Yanukovych, in December 2013, sold $15 billion in Ukrainian bonds to Russia, and cut the price of 
gas by a third, it showed the population that the president did not intend to listen to protests that demanded 
that he take the country closer to the West, and the EU (Diuk 2014). Hoping to sway the government to 
reverse its decision, the protests continued. By the start of 2014, hundreds of thousand protesters were in the 
streets. Many felt that this was another battle between Russia and the West, but in addition, it was a critical 
stage of the evolution of Ukraine (ibid). What had started out as a domestic political movement in Ukraine, 
had become about Ukraine’s geopolitical position in the East-West battle.   
 
A turning point in the protests had come in late November 2013, when Special Forces were sent to clear out 
protesters, and were caught on camera beating protesters with rubber batons (ibid). This lead to a mass rally 
in the start of December, but though several people seemed to side with the protesters, the special forces 
were deployed again, and a three hour stand-off and violent clashes between protesters and police followed. 
The protesters were quick to organize themselves, build barricades, and create a manifesto (ibid). This 
manifesto focused on dealing with the consequences of the clashes between police and protesters, and 
combatting the corruption of the president. The political opposition helped take the conditions to the 
government. It insisted that President Yanukovych should resign and new elections be held. Additionally, the 
AA was to be signed immediately (ibid). 
 
On the 20th February of 2014, the protests in Kiev reached a drastic point, when snipers killed 39 protesters. 
The day after, the EU's ministers of foreign affairs mediated an agreement between Yanukovych and the 
opposition leaders, which required the Constitutional arrangement of 2004 to be reinstated. But only a couple 
of days later, Yanukovych disappeared from Kiev, and the Ukrainian Rada voted to remove him from the 
presidency as a consequence (Flikke 2015:7). Instead, an interim president was chosen, and it was decided to 
hold elections in May of 2014. But Russia did not recognize the new government, and demanded that 
Ukraine observe their gas-price agreement (ibid:8) Russia also expressed concern that western countries 
were meddling with Ukraine's business, with no intention of helping, but only "… for one-sided geopolitical 
calculations" (ibid:9). This showed Russia’s very clear perception of the actions of the West as trying to use 
Ukraine as a geopolitical pawn.  
 
Starting the 26th of February, Russia began military exercises along the border of Ukraine. The next day, the 
Crimean regional parliament was taken over by armed men, and the Russian flag was raised. The Crimean 
parliament held an emergency session the same day, deciding to hold a referendum concerning Crimea's 
status, in May 2014 (ibid). Ukraine’s interim government stated that Russia was directly involved in this, 
though Putin denied having any involvement, saying that the armed men were simply local defense forces 
(Memmot 04.03.2014). On March 1st 2014, the Crimean parliament decided to move up the referendum to 
March 30th. All the while, Ukraine urged the UN’s Security Council (UNSC) to act, and several meetings 
were held, discussing the situation. Several UNSC members urged Russia to remove troops from Crimea, 
Putin dismissed having troops in the area (Flikke 2015:10ff). The Crimean parliament further moved up the 
referendum, and on March 11th, it voted in favor of independence from Ukraine, and membership in the 
Russian Federation (ibid:13). Though Ukrainian officials and UNSC members saw the referendum as 
illegitimate, Putin welcomed Crimean officials as members of the Russian Federation at a speech on March 
18th, and stated that Crimea ‘should be Russian’. The Russian representative in the UNSC declared that the 
referendum was in concurrence with international law, and the UN Charter (ibid:15). The situation in Crimea 
prompted the EU to implement sanctions against Russian military personnel, as well as cancelling a G8 
summit (ibid:14ff). At this stage in the crisis, Russia made plain that they viewed Crimea as part of Russia, 
making it a domestic matter. Clearly, decision makers in Russia percieved the situation as a matter of 
Russian interest. Moreover, the EU sanctions showed how Western countries at this stage percieved the 
situation as Russian aggression.  
 
In April 2014, the situation worsened as armed groups stormed police stations in the Donetsk region, located 
in Eastern Ukraine, calling for independence from Ukraine through a referendum to be held in May. Around 
the same time, pro-Russian militant groups started attacks in areas of the Donetsk region. At this point, 
Ukrainian authorities started to fight uprisings through anti-terrorist operations (ibid:17). Though Putin, in 
late April, acknowledged that Russia had had troops on Crimea during the referendum, he denied that 
Russian military was helping rebels in Eastern Ukraine (ibid:18).  
The situation worsened further, and rebel groups spread to the Luhansk region, before referendums were 
held in May 2014, a majority supported independence for the regions according to the leaders of the 
separatist groups (ibid:19). In late May 2014, the Ukrainian parliament approved a resolution to give rights 
for regions to decide freely on language and culture. At the same time, the presidential elections were held, 
and Petro Poroshenko was elected (ibid:20). Throughout May and June, Ukrainian forces fought the 
separatist movements in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, till June 20th, when Poroshenko announced a 
weeklong ceasefire and peace plan, which Russia dismissed and called “not an invitation to peace, but an 
ultimatum” (ibid:21). 
During the ceasefire, Ukraine signed the AA with the EU. On the 1st of July, fighting resumed in Eastern 
Ukraine, and on July 17th, a Malaysian Airline plane was shot down over Eastern Ukraine. 298 people died, 
and it was suspected that rebels from Russia had shot down the plane (ibid:22f). As the fighting continued, 
the list of EU sanctions expanded, and reports of hundreds of thousands of refugees, fleeing mainly to 
Russia, poured in. In August, Russia sent a convoy of trucks across the border to Ukraine, claiming to send 
humanitarian aid. Ukraine saw this as a direct invasion and claimed that Russia was launching missiles into 
Ukrainian territory (ibid:25). In late August 2014, Russia urged Ukraine to start ‘statehood-talks’ with the 
rebel groups in Eastern Ukraine. In the start of September, the Minsk trilateral group, consisting of Ukraine, 
Russia and the OSCE chairmanship, produced the ‘Minsk protocol’, which outlined 12 points to help 
decrease the situation, including a bilateral ceasefire (ibid:24ff). While the Minsk protocol recognized the 
parties of the rebel groups, the parties decided to hold local elections in the start of November, which only 
Russia stated that they would recognize (ibid:30). In January of 2015, the Minsk-group met again, but 
although they were invited, the representatives from Donetsk and Luhansk did not attend, and the self-
declared republics kept fighting the Ukrainian forces. In February, the diplomatic group Normandy-format 
agreed on a ceasefire (ibid:32ff). Though spokespersons from France and Germany believe the ceasefire to 
be ‘generally holding’, the Ukrainian military claimed to have been shot at, and the rebel groups denied 
ceasefire in some areas, claiming it to be rebel territory. In the end, the Ukrainian military withdrew from 
these areas (ibid:35f). Throughout February, rebels and Ukrainian military fought over areas in Donetsk. In 
March 2015, the deadline in the Minsk protocol for solving the status of Eastern Ukraine ran out, and 
Poroshenko started initiatives within the Ukrainian parliament. The initiatives proposed to give the regions 
of Eastern Ukraine special status, but did not include all areas held by the rebels. They also conditioned that 
all military hardware be removed from the territories, and deemed the areas ‘occupied’ (ibid:41f). The rebel 
groups denied the initiatives, and the fighting continued, as well as disputes over territory. Though there 
have been several initiatives to solve the crisis, and there is continued effort to do so, as of January 2016, the 
fighting continues, and there is still no solution to the situation (European Parliament News 27.01.2016). 
 
Russia 
In 1991 Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union. The two countries already had a close 
relationship, now put on the rocks, as the collapse of the Soviet Union shook the foundations of Russia. This 
meant a loss of superpower status for Russia, and lead to both an ideological vacuum and an economic 
collapse. Russia moved from their former superpower status, and down the international hierarchy. The 
state’s position in the international system had changed, and the 1990s left Russia in a deep identity crisis. 
This was only resolved to some extent by Putin, through economic prosperity due to rising oil prices. Putin 
rebuilt Russian identity on the idea of Russia as a great power, which of course has roots in Russian and 
Soviet history (Rutland 2015: 130). Thus, Putin, and the prominent decision makers in Russia, built Russia 
up on the perception of Russia as an empire, and as being destined for superpower status. For Russia, 
Ukraine was an essential part of being en empire. Ukraine has historically been intertwined with Russian 
culture and language, and with their 46 million people, Ukraine is the largest state of the former Soviet 
empire, apart from Russia itself. Additionally, Ukraine is strategically well placed between Russia and the 
West. But the leaders of Ukraine wanted to build an independent, sovereign state, and were resentful towards 
Russia. However, the two countries kept close economic ties, with Russia as their largest trading partner, and 
most of the Ukrainian export being reliant on cheap energy from Russia. In turn, the Russian defense 
industry, as well as gas industry, was dependent on Ukraine. In 1997, Ukraine gave Russia a lease for the 
Sevastopol naval base in Crimea, lasting 20 years. During the same period, some Russian nationalists argued 
that Crimea should return to Russia, as the peninsula had originally belonged to the country, and had only 
been given to Ukraine in 1954 to mark the 300 years unification of Ukraine and Russia. However, then-
President Yeltsin refused to support the nationalists (ibid:131). This is all a part of the perception of Ukraine, 
held in Russia’s elite. Ukraine is seen as part of the Russian empire, and Russia views Ukraine as a sort of 
little brother. In Russian domestic politics, Ukraine has always been a close partner, and even a part of 
Russia. Hence, when Russia seeks to control their external environment, Ukraine is a natural place to look.  
In 2004, the relationship between Russia and Ukraine was threated when the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 
broke out, and Viktor Yushchenko become president. The revolution was part of a larger movement, and 
Putin felt that it was a campaign by the West to spread pro-Western democratic governments in former 
Soviet spaces, and felt the need to take action, through pro-Kremlin movements. As well as these 
revolutions, Russia felt threated by enlargement of the two main Western organizations, The EU and NATO, 
towards east. Putin argued that this was a direct strategy of containment, created by the US. With the 2008 
Bucharest NATO summit, where NATO stated directly: “…these countries [Georgia and Ukraine, red.] will 
become members of NATO” (NATO 08.05.2014) Putin was severely infuriated, and felt generally provoked 
by the West, stating: “The emergence of a powerful military bloc at our borders will be seen as a direct 
threat to Russian security” (Blomfield 05.04.2008). Both the Orange Revolution and the NATO summit in 
2008 showed how the West did not seem to perceive Russia as a country to take into concern, or to fear. 
Even though Putin made it very clear that Russia would not stand for this treatment, he was ignored, thus 
infuriating decision makers in Russia who viewed the West, specifically the US, as their competitor in the 
game for superpower status.  
The dispute between Russia and the West over former Soviet-space reached a climax when Georgia’s 
President sent forces to South Ossetia, killing Russia peacekeepers in the area. This prompted Russia to 
launch a full-scale invasion of the area, to drive out Georgian forces, and recognize South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as independent areas. Many have argued that, in retrospect, this can be seen as the precedent of the 
situation in Crimea, where Russia again changed internationally recognized border by use of military force 
(Rutland 2015:132). These movements came as Russia tried to regain their superpower status, and felt both 
prevented and ignored by the West, and especially the US. The actions of Russia in the war in Georgia 
showed clearly how Russia was prepared to take actions, and use their relative power, in order to show the 
international society that Russia was back in the game as a major power.  
 
In terms of power, several sources claim that Russia’s power is declining. Senior research fellow Thomas 
Renard writes that Russian economic productivity is low, and combined with the low oil prices and the 
sanctions put in the country during the Ukraine crisis, the country is in a sore spot (Renard 2015). However, 
Russia acts like superpower. Renard argues that these acts can be explained by the perception that the 
Russian elite holds of Russia as a great power. The state acts as if their power resources are much larger than 
they actually are. Additionally, Renard argues that Russia relies heavily on hard power instruments, as the 
country lack soft power. This led to the country only being able to respond, using hard power, as “when you 
only have a hammer, every problem starts looking like a nail” (ibid).  
Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop argues the same exact thing, saying that Russia’s relative power is 
declining, and that Russia is a lesser player than the Soviet Union was (SBS 15.10.2015). So, though 
Russia’s relative power might be decreasing, the state continues to perform power-displays worthy of a 
superpower, to maintain or regain their former status.  
A research paper from Chatham House states that, in order to both gain prosperity and maintain domestic 
control, as well as their great power role, Russia has developed a strategy of sovereign globalization 
(Chatham House 06.01.2016). As Russia gained confidence in itself, the state tried to exercise political 
influence in its environment, specifically through their role as the main energy supplier of Europe. But with 
the decline of growth in the energy export, and general developments in the global energy market, Russia’s 
engagement in the global economy shifted (ibid). In the research paper, it is argued that this has been part of 
what lead to the Ukraine crisis, as Russia sought to make turn their economic position into a source of 
strength, though it seems that with the sanctions put on Russia from the West, Russia might be on the way 
back down (ibid). This argument is in line with the neoclassical realism’s notion that states respond to the 
uncertain international system through seeking to control their external environment.  
It would seem that the country fights against its declining relative power, in order to try and regain their 
position in the international system. The country’s domestic politics, combined with the perceptions of the 
decision makers of the state, also bears mark of this ambition of empire. Several times during the Ukraine 
crisis, Russia stated that they viewed Crimea as part of the Russian Federation, signifying a wish to regain 
territories of the Soviet Union. Additionally, Putin sought to frame Russia as a tough state, saying: “no one 
can intimidate or isolate Russia” (Flikke 2015:31). Additionally, Russia’s several military exercises and 
alleged military support to rebel groups can be seen as Russia showing of their hard power capabilities.   
 
The US 
For the last several decades, the US has been a leading superpower, and has even been seen as the sole 
hegemon of the world. Though the US’ approach towards Russia since the Cold War has changed into 
treating Russia as an emerging democracy, as well as a partner, the US has repeatedly ignored Russia’s 
complaints about NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, a security 
vacuum seemed to develop in Eastern Europe, which the US dealt with in the way of offering the former 
soviet states, now blossoming democracies, membership in NATO. In 1999 Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic joined the alliance, in 2004 seven other countries joined them (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), and in 2009 Croatia and Albania joined as well (Rutland 2015:133). 
Though Russia protested these expansions, western leaders insisted that this did not mean that the West still 
saw Russia as an enemy. Though, to better the relationship between NATO and Russia, a special NATO-
Russia Founding Act was forged in 1997. Even though the US wanted to further expand NATO in 2008 at 
the Bucharest Summit, bringing in Georgia and Ukraine as new members, this was blocked by the European 
members of NATO (ibid). Members like Germany felt that this would anger Russia unnecessarily. But the 
US was determined to hold the door open, and it was decided that Ukraine and Georgia would start a 
membership action plan (ibid). This only doubled Russia’s suspicions, and led them to seek to stop such a 
development, as mentioned above.  
As the 1994 Budapest Memorandum had denuclearized Ukraine, the US policy towards the country was seen 
as a subservient to the US’ policy towards Russia. The Orange Revolution in 2004 bought some hope for a 
close relation between the US and Ukraine, but with pro-Russian Yanukovych winning free elections in 
2010, the US seemed to think their strategy towards Ukraine a dead end, and decided to delegate the western 
policy towards Ukraine to the EU.  
 
In general, looking at the US’ actions leading up to the Ukraine crisis, their superpower status has been clear. 
The US’ relative power is great, and their position in the international system has stayed on top for decades. 
Their superpower position is rarely, is ever, contested, and the decision makers of the state hold the same 
perception. Domestically, their politics reflect the same notion, and though the US economy has suffered 
some in the later years, the country still acts as the sole hegemon of the world. Their external control of their 
environment extends to most of the world, and the US acts as the mediator, judge, and officer in most of the 
world’s conflicts.  
 
The EU 
Enlargement of the EU came as a controversial decision, and several member states feared the consequences. 
But in 2004, the EU had ten new members join (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus). In 2007 Romania and Bulgaria followed, as well as 
Croatia in 2013 (Rutland 2015:134). Though the enlargement was a major advance for democracy in the 
region, it seemed quite impossible that Belarus, Moldova, or Ukraine should live up to the strict criteria for 
joining the EU. In order to solve this, the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy in 2003, which 
provided a framework for cooperating with countries that were not on the membership track. Formally, the 
relationship with the former soviet states was outlined in the Eastern Partnership at the Prague Summit in 
2009. Russia was invited to join, but decided to keep their more privileged bilateral relations with the EU. 
The European Neighborhood Policy was re-launched in 2011, though many argued that it was an empty 
gesture, which ignored the efforts of Russia to prevent countries from reaching association agreement status 
with the EU. Additionally, Russia saw the policy as a geopolitical tool to extend the EU’s sphere of influence 
(ibid:136). In regards to the crisis, there have been initiatives aimed at providing support and cooperation 
between the EU and Ukraine, and the EU offered several means of support to Ukraine.  
The EU, being a close ally to the West, is often viewed by Russia as the US’ right hand, and enlargement of 
the EU, and the European project of spreading of democracy, has been largely viewed by Russia as a breach 
of the Russian sphere of influence. With the EU being a large actor in the Ukraine crisis, and the developing 
relationship between the EU and Ukraine, Russia might be lead to see the actions of the EU as an extension 
of the US’ ambitions to contain Russia. 
 
Balancing 
The relationship between Russia and the West has, according to a number of scholars, played a large role in 
the Ukraine crisis, with some even describing the conflict as a return of Cold War thinking. Russia views 
itself as the opponent of the West strategically, ideologically, and in real politik. The actions of the two states 
might have been balancing behaviour.  
 
Generally, soft power seems to have played a large role in the Ukraine crisis. Though it might not always 
have been intentional, it has been utilized. As before mentioned, the Crimean peninsula has been part of the 
Russian Federation before, and was given as a gift to Ukraine. Therefore, the area has close ties to Russian 
history and culture, and the population has a large ethnic Russian group. The region is generally considered a 
part of the Russian image, a sentiment that Putin repeatedly stated throughout the crisis, saying that: “Crimea 
is our common historical legacy and a very important factor in regional stability. And this strategic territory 
should be part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian” (Flikke 2015:15). The 
shared history and culture gives Russia a large advantage in using soft power to balance the West’s attempt 
to control the region or lead it back to Ukraine. Additionally, soft balancing in the form of diplomatic actions 
took place, as Putin himself spoke of a peaceful transition for Crimea, and emphasizing the shared history 
and culture once again (Yuhas 13.04.2014).  
On the other side of the crisis, the EU and NATO enlargements, taking place since the 1990s, as well as 
several initiatives for pro-democracy movements, in Eastern Europe, can all be seen as soft balancing. The 
inclusion of Eastern European countries, former Soviet states, into western alliances, moves the countries out 
of Russia’s sphere of influence. All are diplomatic efforts to include the states in regional and international 
organizations, but as these organizations are all primarily lead by western countries, they have been seen by 
Russia as an effort to expand the US’ own sphere of influence (Mearsheimer 2014:2). Thus, Russia sees 
these acts of soft balancing as an entrenchment on Russian geopolitical areas of interest.  
During the crisis, the US, the EU, and Russia have all ordered sanctions and embargoes on each other. A 
number of economic sanctions have been put on Russia banks, businessmen and politicians (Flikke 2015). In 
return, Russia has sanctioned US officials, though it has mainly been of symbolic values (Yuhas 
13.04.2014). Furthermore, an embargo has been put on all food products from Western countries, and a ban 
on Ukrainian airspace activity over Russian territory has been adopted (BBC 07.08.2014). All these can be 
seen as soft balancing, as sanctions and embargoes are tools of foreign policy, which can be used to show 
opinion without using hard power.  
 
As mentioned above, the US had previously sort of out-sourced their foreign policy in regards to Ukraine to 
the EU. Additionally, it can be argued that Russia sees the EU as acting for the US. Thus, some balancing 
moves from the EU might be important to the relations between Russia and the US.  
The EU has taken several measures to strengthen the military capabilities of Ukraine, helping them with 
command and control, logistics, and cyber defense (Mearsheimer 2014:10). Though this is not a textbook 
example of semi-hard balancing, it can be seen as a sort of balancing by proxy. The EU helps Ukraine 
strengthen its military capabilities, so it can fight the rebels and separatists, who Russia supports. 
Additionally, the US has committed itself to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In total, 
the US gave $340 million in assistance to Ukraine in 2014 (US Department of State 01.06.2014). $118 
million of these went to ‘security sector capacity and reform’, meaning that the US would provide equipment 
to, and train the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Part of the equipment provided included: “body armor, vehicles, 
night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, radios, patrol boats, rations, tents, counter-
mortar radars, and other related items” (ibid). Like with the EU’s efforts, this can also be seen as semi-hard 
balancing by proxy, as the US spent money and resources to strengthen Ukraine’s military capabilities. This 
can be seen as an attempt to prepare Ukraine for hard balancing Russia, though it is worth mentioning that 
neither the EU, nor the US, has given indication of interest in using their own military capabilities 
(Mearsheimer 2014:12). There have been no instances of hard balancing from the US during the Ukraine 
crisis.  
 
Looking at Russia, they began modernizing their military in 2008, continuing until 2014 (ISS 2015:159). In 
2013, inspections of their armed forces showed a lack of training, as well as a need for restructuring, though 
equipment-repair and maintenance were strengthened. According to these inspections, there was a need for 
reform, which was used as “cover for the covert concentration of incursion forces, as well as providing 
diversionary political effect” (ibid). So, Russia was able to gather military units in Crimea. According to 
Military Balance, several improvements made in the period from 2008 to 2014 were largely beneficial for 
Russia when acting in Crimea. Specifically, this included the improvements in: “personal equipment, 
logistics, personnel discipline, electronic-warfare capability and junior-commander training” (ibid). Thus, 
since 2008, where Russia were involved in Georgia, and leading up to the crisis in Ukraine, Russia’s focus 
on strengthening their military can be seen as semi-hard balancing, in order to secure their hard power 
capabilities. Military Balance notes, however, that most of the troops used in Crimea were special-operation 
troops, who had had higher priority for improvements. The rest of the Russian military still has trouble with 
under-manning and conscription. Additionally, as Russia has faced an economic slowdown, this has affected 
their military capabilities (ibid). Furthermore, the Russian military has provided rebel groups in Ukraine with 
equipment,  
 
In terms of hard balancing, Russia has, as mentioned above, had troops in Crimea. Though they were not 
fighting directly against the US, this can still be seen as a sort of hard balancing, as Russia utilized hard 
power to hold the territory from Ukraine, and keep it within their own sphere of influence.  
 
Thus, both parties have utilized their soft power resources, which through its effects has in part lead to the 
current conflict. Both parties have used soft and semi-hard balancing, as well as hard balancing in Russia’s 
case. The future might show even more of these balancing tactics, as the Ukraine crisis remains a frozen 
conflict. The US has not made any move that would convey a wish to use hard power, though they might 
continue to act with soft and semi-hard balancing, to make Russia leave Crimea, and the rest of Ukraine. But 
it seems most likely that the conflict will stay in the state that it is currently in. 
 
  
Conclusion 
This project concerns how the Ukraine crisis can be seen as a battle between Russia and the West, seen 
through a neoclassical realist lens, looking at the relative power, position in the international system, 
domestic politics, and perceptions of decision makers, for both actors.  
 
Russia’s status in the international system has been through ups and downs since the end of the Soviet 
Union, and though it would seem that the state is attempting to climb up the ladder, it seems to be in a 
situation of declining relative power. Russia’s economic and military capabilities cannot match that of the 
US, but with the domestic politics of the country and the perceptions of the decision makers being focused 
on rebuilding Russia as an empire and a superpower, the state fights through its declining relative power, to 
regain their international status.  
 
The US remains the superpower of the world, as their economic and military capabilities are unchallenged. 
Both their domestic politics and the perceptions of decision makers reflect their uncontested position in the 
international system and large relative power. Additionally, the EU, being a close ally of the US, have acted 
as if they do not regard Russia’s position in the international system as being a challenge to their projects in 
Eastern Europe.  
 
In terms of balancing, both Russia and the West have used soft power resources to sway the outcome of the 
Ukraine conflict. Moreover, both have semi-balanced through strengthening either Ukrainian military or 
rebel groups, so they can do the hard balancing. Last, Russia has utilized its hard power capabilities, to show 
their strong conviction. Though the US has showed no desire to use hard power, they continue their other 
balancing behaviour.   
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